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INTRODUCTION
When Lord Denning retired from the Bench in 1982 a very full and detailed
assessment of his contributions to many areas of the law was published, edited by
Professors Jowell and McAuslan.1 This collection contained perceptive and
thorough essays on administrative law by Jeffrey Jowell, and on human rights by
Claire Palley. It would be superfluous for me to seek to go down that same road -
and anyway in the allotted space it would not be possible to do justice to all that
Lord Denning contributed to public law. So I shall take another approach, and
focus on his contributions on the control of abuses of power and in the area of
what is now supposed to be the divide between public and private law. These are
topics that are currently taxing the courts, and academics, and judges writing
extra-judicially: What is the basis for the jurisdiction of the courts in judicial
review2 and in what ways does it differ from the basis of the courts' jurisdiction
in private law?3 Is there a substantive (as opposed to procedural) public/private
divide?4
These are large questions and it would not be realistic to seek to answer them
here, but light is shed on these issues by the ways in which Lord Denning dealt
with a number of cases. The cases in which I am particularly interested were
mostly brought in the Queen's Bench Division, and not in the Divisional Court
by way of what we would now call judicial review. They were private law
applications for declarations or injunctions for breach of the rules of natural
* Professor of Constitutional Law, University College, London.
1 Lord Denning: The Judge and the Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 1984).
2 C. Forsyth, "Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of
Parliament and Judicial Review" 55 (1996) C.L.J. 122. For critiques of this theory see Sir John
Laws, "Illegality: the Problem of Jurisdiction" in M. Supperstone and 1. Goudie, eds, Judicial
Review (2nd. ed.,Butterworths, 1997) at pp.4.13-4.19; P.P.Craig, "Ultra Vires and the foundations
of judicial review" (1998) 57 C.L.!. 63 at pp.77-8.
3 See essays in M. Taggart, ed. The Province of Administrative Law, (Hart Publishing, 1997).
41. Beatson, "'Public' and 'private' in English administrative law" (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 34 at p.38;
Lord Woolf, "Droit public - English style" [1995] P.L. 57.
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justice and fairness and rationality and non-discrimination.
LORD DENNNING AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
We are accustomed to assuming that "administrative law" is part of public law, so
that in principle cases involving duties of fairness and rationality outside of
contract should be brought by way of judicial review. This assumption has been
reinforced by the decision in 0 'Reilly v. Mackman.5 It is worth noting that, when
this case came before Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal,6 his judgement was
on similar lines to the House of Lords decision:
"Now that judicial review is available to give every kind of remedy,
I think it should be the normal recourse in all cases of public law
where a private person is challenging the conduct of a public
authority or a public body, or of anyone acting in the exercise of a
public duty.,,7
However, as we shall see, for Lord Denning this did not preclude the possibility
of duties of fairness and rationality being imposed on private decision makers in
private law.
In Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union Lord Denning had made explicit
that in his view administrative law was not a sub-species of public law.8 His
concept of administrative law was not limited to public bodies and public
functions:
"It may truly now be said that we have developed a system of
administrative law. These developments have been most marked in
the review of decisions of statutory bodies: but they apply also to
domestic bodies ...,,9 In effect Lord Denning was saying that duties
of fairness and rationality may apply to the decisions of such private
tribunals, categorising them as administrative law duties. The reason
for imposing such duties was that private exercises of power needed
to be controlled. Lord Denning continued in Breen by reviewing
the ways in which statutory bodies are now required to act fairly in
the exercise of discretion, how discretion of a statutory body is
never unfettered but must be exercised reasonably. 10 He then asked:
5 [1983] 2 A.C. 237.
6 [1982] 3 All E.R. 680.
7 Ibid at p.693.
8 [1971] 1 All E.R. 1148 (C.A.).
9 Ibid at p.1153.
10 Ibid at pp.1153-4.
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"Does all this apply to a domestic body? I think it does, at any rate
when it is a body set up by one of the powerful associations which
we see nowadays. Instances are readily to be found in the books,
notably the Stock Exchange, the Jockey Club, the Football
Association, and innumerable trade unions. All these delegate power
to committees. These committees control the destinies of thousands.
They have quite as much power as the statutory bodies of which I
have been speaking. They can make or mar a man by their decisions.
Not only by expelling him from membership, but also by refusing to
admit him as a member, or it may be, by a refusal to grant a licence
or to give their approval. Often their rules are framed to give them a
discretion. They then claim that it is an unfettered discretion with
which the courts have no right to interfere. They go too far. They
claim too much ... their rules are said to be a contract between the
members and the union.So be it. If they are a contract, there is an
implied term that the discretion should be exercised fairly. But the
rules are in reality more than a contract. They are a legislative code
laid down by the council of the union to be obeyed by the members.
This code should be subject to control by the courts just as much as
the code laid down by Parliament itself. If the rules set up a
domestic body and give it a discretion, it is to be implied that body
must exercise its discretion fairly."l!
Here is a strong marker that there is no substantive public/private law divide.
Powerful bodies, whether public or private, are under duties of fairness and
rationality in certain circumstances, particularly where their decisions have a
serious adverse effect on an individual, and the imposition of these duties is not
limited to cases where there is an interference with the "right to work." Read
alongside the decision in 0 "Reilly v. Mackman the implication of Breen is that,
even though it is necessary to proceed by way of application for judicial review
in public law cases - where what is being challenged is, broadly, the exercise of a
public or governmental function - the same or similar duties of fairness and
rationality may arise in private law.
THE BASES FOR THE APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
This brings us to the question, what are the bases for the jurisdiction of the courts
in private law to require bodies to act fairly and rationally in their decision
making? There are a number of bases: contract, where notionally the courts are
not imposing obligations, but giving effect to the express or implied intentions of
the parties; or non-contractual bases, such as the need to protect property rights,
II Ibid at p.1l54.
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to prevent abuse of monopoly power, to protect against restraints of trade, or to
protect a person's right or liberty to work; or general public policy in favour of
controlling abuses of power, which may in fact embrace each of the other heads.
Lord Denning's judgments have considered each of these bases for the
jurisdiction. An additional particular head could be added, the control of the
exercise of common callings - though often these will fall under the monopoly
head. 12Although, as far as I am aware, Lord Denning did not consider the law on
common callings in any detail in his decisions, he relied on one of the leading
cases, The Ipswich Tailors13 in Nagle v. Peilden.
The case of Nagle v. Peilden illustrates these points about the bases for the
private administrative law control of power. 14The plaintiff had been refused a
trainer's licence by the Stewards of the Jockey Club because she was a woman.
She applied for a declaration that this practice was against public policy, and for
an injunction. On the question whether the statement of claim disclosed a cause
of action and whether it should be struck out, the court found for the plaintiff.
Lord Denning's reasoning was based on the fact that the Jockey Club exercised a
"virtual monopoly in an important field of human activity" and that "the common
law of England recognises that a man (sic) has a right to work at his trade or
profession without being unjustly excluded from it.,,15
Under the Treaty of European Union Article 119, the Sex Discrimination
legislation and other measures the particular facts in Nagle v. Peilden could be
dealt with nowadays without recourse to the common law. But the case still
stands as authority for the duty of private regulatory bodies not to discriminate.
So if a person were refused a trainer's licence for irrational reasons not covered
by European law or British legislation, such as their religion, the colour of their
hair, their political affiliations or personal animosity on the part of a member of
the licensing body, applying Nagle v. Feilden the court would again find that this
was unlawful, in effect imposing duties of fair and rational decision making on
the regulatory body.
On the discrimination point Nagle v. Peilden stands out as an exceptional
decision. The record of the common law in recognising the wrong of
discrimination has been generally poor. "... not all sex discrimination is unlawful
....Discrimination is only unlawful if it occurs in one of the fields in which it is
prohibited in the [Sex Discrimination Act 1975].,,16 Refusal to admit a member
12 See B. Wyman, "The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problems" xvn
Harvard Law Review (1903-1904) 156; N. Arterburn, "The Origin and First Test of Public
Callings" 75 U. Penn LR. (1926-27) 411; for an example see Harris v. Dockwood (1810) 3 Taunt
364. See also the discussion of this topic in M. Taggart, Corporatisation, Privatisation and Public
Law (Legal Research Foundation, 1990) at p.29; P.P.Craig [1991] P.L 538.
13 (1614) 11 Co. Rep.53a.
14 [1966] 1 All E.R. 689 (C.A.).
15 Ibid at p.639.
16 In R v. Entry Clearance Officer, ex parte Amin [1983] 2 All E.R. 864 at p.871 per Lord Fraser.
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from an ethnic minority to a members'club is not unlawful.]7 The common law
does not as yet prohibit discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. 18
However, the case law on common callings does show the common law acting
against discrimination: in Constantine v. Imperial Hotels a black West Indian
cricketer successfully sued in tort for the refusal of accommodation in the hotel. 19
According to Lord Denning, the court's jurisdiction to grant a remedy of
declaration or injunction in Nagle v. Feilden was based on public policy. The
plaintiffs case was pleaded on the basis that the practice of the defendants was
"in restraint of trade and contrary to public policy." Lord Denning did not use the
phrase "restraint of trade" in his reasoning, and dealt with the case on public
.policy grounds. In particular he held that:
"a man's right to work at his trade or profession is just as important
to him as, perhaps more important than, his right to property. Just as
the courts will intervene to protect his rights of property, so they
will also intervene to protect his right to work. 20
This is an important point, as it opens up wider grounds for the courts to
control decision making in private law than restraint of trade, which is of fairly
narrow application. Other case law supports the view that there is jurisdiction to
control decision making of private bodies outside restraint of trade, or contract,
or for the protection of property rights - or to protect a right to work. In effect the
courts will rest their jurisdiction on a range of public policy considerations.
For instance, in McInnes v. Onslow Fane the plaintiffs application for a boxing
manager's licence had been refused and he was complaining of the lack of a
hearing.21 The plaintiff failed because this was an application case, not a case of
forfeiture or legitimate expectation, and there had been no breach of the relevant
duties of fairness in dealing with applications. But Megarry V.-C. laid down
requirements of a range of fair decision making procedures in application,
forfeiture or legitimate expectation cases affecting a "liberty to work." They
include a duty "to reach an honest conclusion without bias and not in pursuance
of any capricious policy,,22- a formulation, like that in Nagle, that is reminiscent
of Wednesbury reasonableness.
Megarry V.-C.'s requirements in McInnes did not depend on the existence of a
17 Charter v. Race Relations Board [1973] A.C. 686 and Docker's Labour Club v. Race Relations
Board [1976] A.C. 285.
]8 See R. v.Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] Q.B. 517; Grant v. South West Trains
[1998] All E.R. [E.C.] 193. P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] I.R.L.R. 347;
Chessington World of Adventures v. Reed [1997] I.R.L.R. 556.
19 [1944] 1K.B. 693.
20 Ibid at p.694.
21 [1978] 1W.L.R. 1520
22 Ibid at p.1530.
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contractual relationship, and nor did he base his decision in restraint of trade. He
was drawing analogies with a wide range of cases on immigration, reputations,
privacy and status as well as livelihood. The foundation of the jurisdiction
appears to have been public policy - here policy in favour of enabling people to
earn their living in their own way.
Although Nagle v. Feilden is the leading case on the imposition of rationality
in private decision making, Lord Denning discussed the basis for obligations of
fairness and rationality in private decision making in a number of other cases. In
Lee v. Showman s Guild, for instance, he emphasised that obligations on such an
association as the defendants were not only derived from contract, but are also
governed by public policy: 23
"Although the jurisdiction of a domestic tribunal is based on
contract ... the parties are not free to make what contract they like.
There are important limitations imposed by public policy. The
tribunal must, for instance, observe the principles of natural justice .
... Any stipulation to the contrary would be invalid. They cannot
stipulate for the power to condemn a man unheard. ,,24
Later in the case he focused on the inequality of bargaining power in the
relationship:
"It is very different with domestic tribunals which sit in judgment on
the members of a trade or profession. They wield powers as great as,
if not greater than, any exercised by the courts of law. They can
deprive a man (sic) of his livelihood. They can ban him from the
trade in which he has spent his life and which is the only trade he
knows. They are usually empowered to do this for any breach of
their rules, which, be it noted, are rules which they impose and
which he has no real opportunity of accepting or rejecting. In theory
their powers are based on contract. The man is supposed to have
contracted to give them these great powers; but in practice he has no
choice in the matter.,,25
Hence the public policy on which the duties were based was that of preventing
abuses of (private) power which interfere with a person's "right to work."
In Enderby Town Football Club v. Football Association Lord Denning
developed the concept that rules of associations are a legislative code, giving rise
23 [1952] 1All E.R. 1175.
24 Ibid at pp.1l80-!.
2S Ibid at p.1l8!.
76
THE PUBLICIPRIV ATE DIVIDE
26to control by the courts:
"Putting the fiction aside the truth is that the rules are nothing more
nor less than a legislative code - a set of regulations laid down by
the governing body to be observed by all who are, or become,
members of the association. Such regulations, though said to be a
contract, are subject to the control of the Courts. If they are
unreasonable restraint of trade they are invalid: see Dickson v.
Pharmaceutical Society., .. If they unreasonably shut out a man from
his right to work, they are invalid ... see Nagle v. Feilden ...,,27
Here Lord Denning was clearly distinguishing two grounds for intervention,
restraint of trade and public policy, and maintaining a separate basis from
restraint of trade or contract for the court's jurisdiction to intervene.
Thus in these cases the courts have been claiming a power to impose duties on
private bodies, not on the basis that they are in contractual relationships with
their members - nor infringing property rights - but because they are private
legislators under a duty, as exercisers of power, to exercise their powers with due
regard for the impact of their decisions on those affected by them.
That this is still an important issue is illustrated by the difficulties experienced
in finding a legal basis for the control of private regulatory power in the light of
the decision in Law v. National Greyhound Racing Club to the effect that
regulatory bodies in sport are not subject to judicial review.28 This raises the
question whether they are subject to duties of fairness and rationality in private
law. Nagle v. Feilden and the other cases referred to above would suggest that
they are.
In Stevenage Borough Football Club Ltd. v. The Football League Ltd.
Stevenage Football Club had sought, in the Chancery Division, to challenge the
validity of the criteria applied by the Football League in refusing Stevenage
promotion to the third division.29 Stevenage alleged that the criteria were in
restraint of trade and unreasonable. Carnwath J. observed that there appeared to
be several lines of cases in which the courts had exercised a supervisory
jurisdiction, awarding declarations or injunctions as remedies. First, those in
which the court focused on the control of ~ower exercised by regulatory bodies,
treating their rules as legislative in nature. 0 Carnwath J. particularly mentioned
Lord Denning's judgments in Enderby Town Football Club v. Football
26 [1971] 1 All E.R. 215.
27 Ibid at p.219. The reference for Dickson is [1970] A.C. 403.
28 [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1302.
29 Unreported, 23rd July, 1996. The decision was upheld in the Court of Appeal: (1997) 9 Admin.
L.R. 109.
30 Transcript of Stevenage, ibid at p.28.
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Association31 and Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union.32 Second, those
which like Nagle v. Feilden, approached this kind of matter as raising issues of
restraint of trade. Carnwath 1. commented that this appears to be the preferred
approach in the Chancery Division33 - although it is notable that Lord Denning
did not treat Nagle v. Feilden as a restraint of trade case, and nor did Megarry V.-
C. treat McInnes v. Onslow Fane as a restraint of trade case. And third, cases
including Nagle in places - especially in the judgment of Salmon L.J. - which
have held that it was unlawful to deprive a person of the right or liberty to
work. 34 Carnwath J. considered that he would have had jurisdiction to grant
declaratory relief to Stevenage, but that he was entitled in the exercise of his
discretion to refuse relief because of the delay on the part of the plaintiff and the
prejudice to third parties that this would cause.35 The Court of Appeal endorsed
this view. 36
FUNDAMENTAL VALUES
We have seen that Lord Denning expressed a number of justifications for his
view that the courts were entitled to impose duties of fairness and rationality on
decision makers in these cases. I suggest that there is behind these and other
decisions of Lord Denning - and indeed many decisions in public and private
administrative law - a coherent set of values which the courts are seeking to
protect by requiring that they be given some weight and relevance by decision
makers. Nagle was about the right or liberty to work. The importance of work for
an individual is that it provides him or her with security in the form of an income,
and status in society. Denial of a right to work by a professional or regulatory
body may amount to a denial of the right to live one's life in one's own way - a
denial of autonomy. It may carry a slur on the applicant's character which could
lower him or her in the eyes of society.
But the right or liberty to work was not the only interest that Lord Denning was
seeking to protect in his decisions. In Breen the plaintiff had been refused
recognition as a shop steward by the union despite the fact that his fellow
workers had elected him. Discussing the remedy Lord Denning said:
"... he has suffered in reputation and standing. He has been injured
in his proper feelings of dignity and pride. He has lost the chance of
31 [1971] Ch. 591 and supra n.26.
32 [1971] 2 Q.B. 175 and supra n.8.
33 Supra n.30 at p.29. And see Watson v. Prager [1991] 1W.L.R. 726 per Scott 1.
34 Ibid at p.28. See also Mclnnes v. Onslow Fane supra n.21.
35 Ibid at pp.56-7 & 61.
36 (1997) 9 Admin. L.R. 109.
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a career of honour in the union.,,3?
In holding that a declaration should be granted that the refusal by the union to
recognise him as shop steward was invalid, Lord Denning reasoned that "it will
justify him in the eyes of his fellow workers.',3SClearly the plaintiffs interest in
his own dignity, respect and status were what influenced Lord Denning to decide
in his favour. 39Examples could be multiplied, but overall it is suggested that the
justifications for imposing duties of fairness and rationality in private decision
making and in public decision making are the same, a recognition of the fact that
individuals have legitimate interests in their own autonomy, dignity, respect,
status and security, and that this calls for those in positions of power over
individuals to weigh up those interests in their decision making.40
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Claire Palley, in her essay in the Jowel1/McAuslan collection, suggests that since
at least 1949 Lord Denning had been preoccupiecl with the themes of power,
responsibility and abuse of power (including dishonourab1e conduct and
exploitation of process) whether by public authorities, groups or individuals.41
The cases referred to above are only a small selection of those in which Lord
Denning sought to control abuses of power. But they are of particular importance
for administrative law in showing how it is not simply a branch of public law but
a technique for controlling exercises of power on both sides of the public/private
divide. Lord Denning's approach can help to resolve the problems caused by the
decisions in 0 Reilly v. Mackman and Law v. Greyhound Racing Club. He
accepted a procedural divide in his judgment in the Court of Appeal in 0 Reilly,
but this need not preclude the courts exercising controls in private law. In effect
the common law has long provided protection for individuals whose vital
interests are threatened by exercises of decision making power whether by public
or private bodies, using as its basis public policy. There are certain well
established heads of public policy - implied contractual terms, restraint of trade.
But the categories of public policy are not closed, and according to Lord
Denning, they extend to cases where there is an imbalance of power between the
parties and the weaker party's interests in his or her dignity, autonomy, respect,
status or security are at risk.
37 Supra n.8 at p.1l57.
38 Ibid at p.1l56.
39 In this result of the case Lord Denning was in a minority, and the other judges in the Court of
Appeal found against the plaintiff on the facts found by the trial judge and on evidential points.
40 I have outlined this argument in "The underlying values of public and private law" in M.
Taggart, ed., supra n.3; and "Common values in public and private law and the public/private
divide" [1997] P.L. 630.
41 "Lord Denning and Human Rights - Reassertion of the Right to Justice" supra n.1 at p.364.
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